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“The purpose of a proof is to understand, not verify”-- Arnold Ross.
In mathematics, a proof is a demonstration that, given certain axioms, some statement of interest is necessarily true. Proofs employ logic but usually include some amount of natural language which of course admits some ambiguity. In fact, the vast majority of proofs in written mathematics can 
be considered as applications of informal logic. The distinction has led to much 
examination of current and historical mathematical practice, quasi-empiricism 
in mathematics. One of the concerns with the philosophy of mathematics is the 
role of language and logic in proofs, and mathematics as a language. Regardless 
of one’s attitude to formalism, the result that is proved to be true is a theorem; 
in a completely formal proof it would be the final word, and the complete proof 
shows how it follows from the axioms alone. Once a theorem is proved, it can 
be used as the basis to prove further statements. The so-called foundations 
of mathematics are those statements one cannot, or need not, prove. These 
were once the primary study of philosophers or mathematicians. Today 
focus is more on practice, i.e. acceptable techniques. Pictures are commonly 
used in mathematical practice to help further understanding of mathematical 
knowledge.
The purpose of this paper is to explain the relationship between visual or 
geometric proofs and verbal-symbolic or analytic proofs in mathematics. 
Through philosophical analysis of some important cases of geometric proofs, 
I want to show that their function is primarily to help us “see” how the 
corresponding analytic proof of a theorem is true.  Furthermore, I argue (contra 
philosopher Imre Lakatos), that producing standard analytic proofs is the real 
business of mathematics.
Philosopher Imre Lakatos, describing the history of mathematics, sees three 
major theoretical views of mathematics: Euclidean, Inductivist, and Quasi-
Empirical. The Euclidean theory characterizes mathematics as a set of axioms 
and the whole “process” transmits truth down through a proof to get to the truth 
of a mathematical proposition. This is the classical view of mathematics as most 
ordinary mathematicians would view it. 
The Inductivist theory follows in the wake of increased rigor in science, by 
starting with theories and observation statements, then collecting data which can 
confirm evidence for generalization; you could say a true proposition transmits 
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truth upward. This can be viewed as an empiricist theory which 
is applied to scientific research. 
Quasi-Empirical theories are the opposite of the Inductivist 
theory because in this theory falsity is “transmitted upward” 
through falsifiers. With the use of heuristic falsifiers we can then 
suspect that a certain proposition is false. In the Quasi-Empirical 
theory, one can argue that no science is capable of finding all 
counter-examples to a theory, therefore, no science is strictly 
empirical, and it’s all quasi-empirical. But usually, the term “quasi-
empirical” refers to the means of choosing problems to focus on 
(or ignore), selecting prior work on which to build an argument or 
proof, notations for informal claims, peer review and acceptance, 
and incentives to discover, ignore, or correct errors. Imre Lakatos 
thinks most of the work in mathematics falls under this theory.
Crucial to making a quasi-empiricist philosophy of mathematics 
work is the distinction between formal and informal mathematics. 
In formal mathematics the basic structures are axioms, rules 
of inference, and formal proofs. In mathematics all of these 
concepts are rigorously defined which in turn no longer make 
them intuitive.  However, through rigorous inference we get 
certainty out of formal mathematics. But Lakatos says that as we 
gain certainty of formal mathematics we lose content because we 
lose sight of the intuitive objects of mathematics. So, he wants 
to use informal mathematics as a means to securing content of 
mathematical concepts. Lakatos says that informal mathematics 
is formal mathematics which suppresses mention of the logical 
rules of inference and logical axioms, and indicates only every use 
of specific postulates. Informal mathematics is about objects of 
intuition (e.g. objects like circles, spheres, planes, etc). Informal 
mathematical operations are less formal or rigorously defined 
(rotation, division, bisection, etc). Lakatos thinks this is where 
the real work is done in mathematics. But, I want to show that 
mathematics isn’t really established without precision and rigor 
of actual formal mathematics.
In formal mathematics, truths are established via proof. There are 
many ways to falsify mathematics; most of these include finding 
flaws that can be revealed in the proof of a proposition. We can 
show a conjecture to be false through counterexamples. Consider 
the example, all primes are odd. The counterexample for this 
conjecture is the number 2, which has been proven to be prime, 
which leads to a contradiction of the original conjecture. This is 
different from cases in science in which data falsify theories which 
leads to a disconfirmed theory, not a false one. The question is 
then, is there a mathematical correlate to data which run contrary 
to a theory?
The potential falsifiers of science express the hard facts. But is 
there anything equivalent to hard facts in mathematics? Lakatos 
says that if we accept the view that a formal axiomatic theory 
implicitly defines its subject-matter, then there would be no 
mathematical falsifiers except logical ones. But if we insist that 
a formal theory should be the formalization of some informal 
theory, then a formal theory may be said to be refuted if one of its 
theorems is negated by the corresponding theorem of the informal 
theory. Lakatos calls such an informal theorem a heuristic falsifier 
of the formal theory (Lakatos, 1976).
Lakatos uses an example of heuristic falsification, citing 
Goldbach’s Conjecture. Recall Goldbach’s conjecture that every 
even integer k greater than two is the sum of two primes. It has 
not yet been proven, although it has been confirmed for a large 
number of cases.  Lakatos suggests the following scenario to 
explain the notion of a heuristic falsifier: 
We may some day face a situation where some machine 
churns out a formal proof in a formal set theory of a formula 
whose intended interpretation is that there exists a non-
Goldbachian even number. At the same time, a number 
theorist might prove (informally) that all even numbers are 
Goldbachian.  If his proof can be formalized within our system 
of set theory, then our theory will be inconsistent.  But, if 
[the informal proof ] cannot be thus formalized, the formal 
set theory will not [have been shown to] be inconsistent, but 
only to be a false theory of arithmetic.  The theory is false in 
respect of the informal explanandum that it had set out to 
explain; we had better replace it with a better one (Lakatos, 
1976).
Lakatos calls this informal proof a heuristic falsifier because it 
shows that there is a problem with the formal theory; namely, 
that it does not explain some fact demonstrated informally.  To 
remedy the problem, Lakatos suggests we check the definitions 
(in this case the definition of `natural number’ may be suspect) 
and adjust the definitions to accommodate the heuristic falsifiers 
(Womack, 1996).
What does heuristic falsification have to do with formal vs. 
informal mathematics? Geometric proofs seem to fall into the 
informal category, whereas verbal, rigorous, symbolic proofs 
fall into the formal category. Are they equally acceptable and 
equally certain? Geometric proofs are an important part of the 
work of informal mathematics; they help show how a theorem 
could be true, providing some informal reasoning. Lakatos tried 
to establish that no theorem of informal mathematics is final or 
perfect. This means that we should not think that a theorem is 
ultimately true, only that no counterexample has been found. 
Once a counterexample is found, we adjust the theorem, possibly 
extending the domain of its validity. This is a continuous way our 
knowledge accumulates, through the logic and process of proofs 
and refutations. Lakatos is opposed of turning geometrical proofs 
into analytic ones because he thinks that formalizing ignores the 
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substance of an argument by focusing on the proof rather than 
the context in which the argument was raised.
The thesis of Lakatos’ book Proofs and Refutations is that the 
development of mathematics does not consist (as conventional 
philosophy of mathematics tells us it does) in the steady 
accumulation of eternal truths. Mathematics develops, according 
to Lakatos, in a much more dramatic and exciting way - by 
a process of conjecture, followed by attempts to ‘prove’ the 
conjecture (i.e. to reduce it to other conjectures) followed by 
criticism via attempts to produce counter-examples both to the 
conjectured theorem and to the various steps in the proof. 
To test Lakatos’ views on varieties of proofs, I will examine some 
cases of geometric and analytic proofs.  The most famous of these 
is the Euler Conjecture—that the number of vertices minus the 
number of edges plus the number of faces for regular polyhedra 
equals two (V - E + F = 2). We can see this for a cube:  it has eight 
vertices, twelve edges and six faces; 8 – 12 + 6 = 2.  Its geometric 
proof is revealing, but I argue that its real function is to help us 
construct a more abstract symbolic or analytic proof.  The latter 
conveys what is really important about the class of polyhedra. 
This example shown in Proofs and Refutations illustrates more 
than the way in which new formal theories are born, it illustrates 
the nature of mathematical progress: how analytical proof helps 
capture the fundamental subject. Lakatos say that mathematicians 
would accept this proof. But he says we did not prove anything 
in any logical sense. There are no postulates, no well-defined 
underlying logic, and there does not seem to be any feasible way 
to formalize this reasoning. What we did was intuitively show that 
the theorem was true. Lakatos says that because our proof really 
isn’t a proof then this informal proof cannot be defined; this in 
turn means a theorem cannot be defined. There is no verification. 
He continues to say that if there is no method of verification, 
there is certainly a method of falsification (Lakatos, 1976).
Mathematics is based on proof in the end, when one field of 
interest reaches its final, axiomatic stage - so much should be 
granted for the formalist school – but then this field becomes 
empty and dead. The introduction of the historical dimension 
of mathematics serves the purpose of seeing mathematics as a 
process: in philosophy, what we are interested in is not the formal 
features of knowledge, but rather the growth of knowledge. 
As Lakatos emphasizes: in mathematics, all growth in rigor is 
transformed to be a growth in content; that is, every criticism 
that increases the strictness of methodology and terminology 
in one question, also increases the range of our knowledge and 
understanding available for scientific (i.e. inductive) methods 
(Brown, 1999).
The task at hand is to figure out what a given mathematical 
concept is, and what a stretch of mathematical discourse says. 
The Lakatos study begins with a proof consisting of a thought 
experiment in which one removes the face of a given polyhedron, 
stretches the remainder out on a flat surface, and then draws 
lines, cuts, and removes the various parts. The development is 
convincing and has the flavor of a proof, but it is not at all clear 
how the discussion is to be understood. This shows that sometimes 
developments within mathematics lead to unclarities about what 
a certain concept is and it seems that the proper methodology, 
and the logic, of mathematics is at stake (Shapiro, 2000).
The question to ask now is what’s the connection between Lakatos’ 
geometric proof and analytic proof? My answer to the question 
is that for geometric proofs you need the axiomatic form of the 
analytic proof; without it, it is not clear what is doing the logical 
work. If you don’t know what is following from what, you’ll be 
less certain of the results. In a sense, geometric proofs are only a 
starting point for proving a mathematical theorem; that is to say, 
they lack some features of analytic proof.
Let’s now look at a case of a very compelling geometric proof in 
the history of mathematics – Cantor’s countability of the rational 
numbers.
Geometric proof:
( Mathematical Foundations, 2000)
This first picture shows the way to list all of the rational numbers 
without omitting any (a close inspection will reveal that all of 
the numbers, ad infinitum, will appear. The problem with this 
approach is that you’ll never finish row 1. Hence, you can’t 
possibly count all of the rationals this way. But, it turns out that 
there is a way to count them. Again, start at row 1, column 1. 
Then, go to R1C2. After that, go to: R2C1, R3C1, R2C2, R1C3, 
R1C4, etc.... This is illustrated ahead: 
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( Mathematical Foundations, 2000)
This picture shows a function that, by following the diagonal 
line, we count each of the rational numbers listed by assigning a 
natural number to each rational number, without omitting any. 
Thus a one-to-one correlation between the natural and rational 
numbers is demonstrated, thus proving the countability of the 
rational numbers.
Many questions arise when looking at this geometric proof of the 
countablility of the rational numbers. For instance: what counts 
as a right way of listing all of the rational numbers? Cantor seems 
to have grasped a solution to the list, but is there a different and 
possibly better way? This proof leaves itself open to all kinds of 
questions which lead to heuristic falsification. What we need is a 
more explicit way of characterizing this function to understand 
how and why it works.
Let us now look at a standard symbolic proof:
Symbolic Proof: 
Consider a base-12 number system with / as the symbol 
for the digit 10 and – as the symbol for 11. Define the 
map φ: Q_N(12) (natural numbers base-12) by φ(a/b)=a/
b, where on the left-hand side, a/b is the lowest terms 
representation of a typical element Q and on the right-
hand side, a/b mean the base-12 number consisting of the 
digits of a (possibly preceded by a minus sign) followed by 
the division slash / and then the digits of b.
For example, φ(-5/12) = -5/12. Let σ: N(12)_N be the 
obvious injection converting a number from base-12 to 
base-10. Continuing our example, this means:
σ (-5/12) = 11 _ 124 + 5 _ 123 + 10 _ 122 + 1 _ 121 + 2 _ 
120 = 238,190
Then σ _ φ: Q_N is an injection, where by |Q| ≤ |N|. 
Inclusion provides the reverse inequality and we conclude 
|Q| = |N| (Ginsberg, 2005).
Here I have presented two very different ways to show that the 
rational numbers are countable. This method of enumerating sets 
certainly does not displace Cantor’s classic technique, but it does 
show another, more rigorous way to accomplish the task. Though 
we applied it only to Q, the method presented here can, be used 
to count any set X, such that N ≤ X (so we may apply inclusion) 
for which a sufficiently clever function from X into N(n) for some 
base-n can be found. However, this proof, unlike Cantor’s proof, 
doesn’t leave itself open to questions or speculations about 
possible alternatives except formal, identifiable flaws in proof (e.g. 
wrong definition of bijection, etc). Picture proofs don’t answer as 
many questions as they raise whereas rigorous/symbolic proofs 
settle the matter about very specific content.
Despite my criticism, I find there are benefits to thinking about 
proof in Lakatos’ way. With the informal view of mathematics we 
can see it as a growth area where new problems arise as well as 
new principles. However, what Lakatos’ view lacks is explicitness: 
following proof from axioms down through the logical process to 
arrive at the demonstration of the truth of a proposition. Picture 
proofs also lacks certainty. Without the inferential transparency 
(Womack, 1996) - the explicit step-by-step explanation of how 
one step follows from another in the process of proof - we begin 
to lose certainty about the theorem. This, to me, shows that 
informal mathematics cannot replace formal mathematics; it 
instead helps formal mathematics in its process. We need formal 
proof as a final judge of truth.
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